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‘FREE’ TRADE AGREEMENTS - Making Them Better
Prepared by
John Humphreys and Andrew Stoeckel
December 2005
RIRDC Publication No 05/035
If this trade is new trade, it is called trade creation and it creates
a benefit. If this trade is diverted from lower-cost supplying countries
then it is called trade diversion and it creates a cost. Either outcome
is theoretically possible and empirical evidence has shown that some PTAs
are net trade creating and some are net trade diverting. To fully understand
these trade effects it is necessary to consider PTAs in a global economy-wide
framework.
Cheaper imports and more robust international competition from a PTA can lead to productivity improvements as firms are forced to innovate and imitate world’s best practice in order to stay competitive.
The competition benefits from trade are less certain than the trade benefits. However, growing econometric and anecdotal evidence suggests there is some competitive benefit from trade.
PTAs often include several non-trade issues that can cause negative or positive net impacts. Two issues of particular relevance are changes to investment rules and changes to trade risk and certainty. Investment liberalisation and increased certainty can provide significant benefits. But PTA negotiations increasingly consider more domestic issues such as intellectual property, competition rules and regulation of the labour market and the environment. The value of including these auxiliary areas is questionable.
PTAs are constrained by several limitations. Important multilateral issues, such as the reform of domestic subsidies, are often excluded from PTA considerations.
Also, rules of origin and safeguard measures are common and costly elements of PTAs.
The political economy impact of PTAs is difficult to assess and impossible to quantify. Depending on its nature, a PTA can either complement or substitute for multilateral negotiations. The growth of PTAs around the world could result in several outcomes: free trade, the formation of several large trading blocs or a complex mesh of overlapping and inconsistent agreements.
Debates about the virtues and vices of PTAs have occupied the attention of economists for years. This book does not attempt to resolve the debate either for or against PTAs. That debate remains inconclusive today for good reason: there is no empirical test that could resolve that debate. Given the ‘stampede’ by countries to form as many PTAs as possible and the difficulty of changing that, a more fruitful approach is to adopt the suggested checklist of points to enhance the good things about PTAs and minimise the bad things.
The costs of PTAs can be reduced in a number of ways:
The success of multilateral negotiations would make PTAs less relevant. PTAs are a second best avenue towards complete free trade and if multilateral trade liberalisation through the Doha round of trade talks could be accelerated then PTAs would become redundant:
Ten-point checklist for better PTAs
GATT Article XXIV that permits countries to form bilateral or regional
trade agreements requires that PTAs cover ‘substantially all’ trade. This
requirement should be clarified and enforced and should be taken to mean
substantially all (taken to mean 95 per cent) of the trade that would occur
under free trade; and
To help improve the quality and consistency of PTAs, the WTO could develop and promote a PTA template for member nations to use. Such a template could make use of the ten-point checklist.
Outside of the WTO, countries can maximise their benefits from PTAs
in a couple of ways:
With or without a WTO template, countries should develop consistent
rules for trade negotiations and consider each PTA in the context of the
ten-point checklist.
Countries genuinely interested in pursuing free trade could establish
a non-region specific, fully comprehensive evolutionary PTA. The rules
of the PTA would specify the requirements for membership, but would not
specify the members. Any country that complies with the membership requirements
would be included.
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